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Abstract. Payment networks were introduced to address the limitation
on the transaction throughput of popular blockchains. To open a pay-
ment channel one has to publish a transaction on-chain and pay the
appropriate transaction fee. A transaction can be routed in the network,
as long as there is a path of channels with the necessary capital. The
intermediate nodes on this path can ask for a fee to forward the trans-
action. Hence, opening channels, although costly, can benefit a party,
both by reducing the cost of the party for sending a transaction and by
collecting the fees from forwarding transactions of other parties.
This trade-off spawns a network creation game between the channel par-
ties. In this work, we introduce the first game theoretic model for analyz-
ing the network creation game on blockchain payment channels. Further,
we examine various network structures (path, star, complete bipartite
graph and clique) and determine for each one of them the constraints
(fee value) under which they constitute a Nash equilibrium, given a fixed
fee policy. Last, we show that the star is a Nash equilibrium when each
channel party can freely decide the channel fee. On the other hand, we
prove the complete bipartite graph can never be a Nash equilibrium,
given a free fee policy.
Keywords: blockchain· payment channels· layer 2· creation game· net-
work design· Nash equilibrium· payment hubs
1 Introduction
Distributed ledgers that employ the Nakamoto [13] or similar consensus mecha-
nisms suffer from major scalability problems [8]. In essence, the security of the
consensus is based on the ability of each node to verify and store a replica of
the entire blockchain history. Prominent solutions to this problem are payment
channels [10,14,17]. Payment channels are constructions that allow participants
of the blockchain to execute the transactions off-chain while maintaining the
security guarantees of the blockchain. The parties that enter a payment channel
open a joint account with a specific capital and update the distribution of this
capital every time they exchange a transaction. This way the parties can execute
an unlimited number of transactions as long as they all agree on the current dis-
tribution of capital. In case of a dispute, the blockchain acts as a judge, ensuring
that the latest agreed capital distribution is enforced.
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Multiple payment channels create a payment network, where a transaction
can be executed even though there is no direct channel between payer and payee.
Currently, this is achieved with the Bitcoin Lightning Network [14] using Hash
Timelock Contracts (HTLCs) [1,10]. When a sender wants to route a transaction
through the network, a path of channels is discovered that has enough capital on
each edge to route the transactions to the receiver [12,15,16]. The intermediate
nodes that move their capital act as service providers for the sender, and ask for a
fee for their service. Therefore, operating a payment channel can offer revenue to
the owner of the channel apart from reducing the cost of executing transactions
on-chain. On the other hand, creating a payment channel is costly, since the
opening and closing of the channel must occur on-chain, which requires to pay
the regular blockchain transaction fee to the miner.
In this work, we study this trade-off. We investigate possible strategies for
a participant. Assuming a constant blockchain fee for each transaction, when
does it make sense to open a channel? If a path from sender to receiver already
exists, does it make sense to create a cheaper path (or even a direct channel) to
claim the fees for forwarding transactions? Our goal is to understand under which
constraints specific network structures are Nash equilibiria. In other words, when
can the participants of the network increase their profit (or decrease their costs)
by changing the network structure? Further, we ask which network structures
are stable under a free fee policy where each node on the network that operates
a channel can set its own fee on the channel. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first to analyze payment channels in a formal game theoretic model.
Our Contributions. First, we introduce a formal game-theoretic model which
we later use to study the potential strategies for network creation for the nodes
of the payment network. The model encapsulates a network creation game on
payment channels: each node of the network can create multiple channels to
other nodes to collect fees from the transactions that are routed through their
channel. However, each channel creation costs the blockchain fee, and also each
node competes with the other nodes in the network, since the sender of each
transactions will choose the cheapest path to route the transaction to the re-
ceiver.
We assume there is a fixed fee a sender has to pay to each intermediate
node to route the transaction to the receiver. Further, we assume nodes have
unlimited temporary capital, and that each pair of nodes are sender and receiver
to an equal amount of transactions. Under these assumptions, we explore various
network structures, namely the path, the star, the complete bipartite graph and
the clique. We find that each network structure constitutes a Nash equilibrium
for a specific fee value. In particular, we show that the path is a weak Nash
equilibrium only if the network fee is zero. Then, we show an upper bound
for value of the fee on the star graph. The bound depends on the number of
transactions, number of nodes and the value of the blockchain fee. This means
that creating a hub is a Nash equilibrium as long as the fee is very low (compared
to the blockchain fee). We observe that if the fee is above the upper bound, a two-
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stars structure emerges as a Nash equilibrium. We generalize this observation by
examining complete bipartite graphs. We provide upper and lower bounds for
such graphs which additionally depend on the number of centers (smaller side of
the complete bipartite graph). This specific network structure defines an entire
class of Nash equilibria. Finally, we consider the complete graph (clique), which
is naturally a Nash equilibria when the network fee is very high.
From the plethora of network structures that constitute Nash equilibria when
the fee policy is fixed, only the star is stable under a free fee policy. Specifically,
we show that the star is a pure Nash equilibrium, and the nodes will set the fee
almost equal to the upper bound of the fixed fee policy. Further, we prove that
the complete bipartite graph can never be a Nash equilibrium when nodes chose
the fee of their channels freely as part of their strategy.
2 Model
In this section, we introduce the game theoretic model. To this end, we first
define the necessary notation and assumptions.
Capital & fees. We assume all participants (nodes of the network) have unlimited
temporary capital and thus the capital locked in all channels is also considered
unlimited. This means that the channels can never be depleted. Moreover, this
leads to stable fees that do not depend on the value of the routed transaction,
because the participants are only interested in the number of transactions routed
through their channel since the capital movement does not cost (they have un-
limited capacity).
The cost of every transaction and hence the cost of opening and closing a
channel on the blockchain costs the blockchain fee. We assume a fixed blockchain
fee, FB ∈ R+, i.e., the fee is constant and stable over time. Further, we assume
the fee is unilaterally paid by the node opening or closing the channel. We also
assume a fee f0 for forwarding a transaction through a channel (that is not
owned by the sender of the transaction) is the same for all nodes and stable in
time.
Information & time. We assume full information, i.e., every node of the system
knows the complete payment scenario, and the channels created by other nodes.
Although the decision of closing and opening a channel can occur at any time
by any participant of the network, we assume a simultaneous game, i.e., the par-
ticipants open the channels in the beginning before executing any transactions.
This is reasonable because we assume a full information game, thus every node
knows its optimal strategy apriori.
Notation. The set of nodes participating in the network is denoted byN , and the
set of transactions to be executed (payment scenario) by P . We assume N > 3
and we use the terms transaction and payment interchangeably throughout the
paper. We define as R(x, p) the (set of) cheapest route(s) of a transaction p ∈ P
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in network state x. The network state x is dependent on the strategy of the
nodes, i.e. which channels the nodes have opened in the network. We note that
if there is no route with cost lower than the blockchain fee, the set will return
empty and the transaction will be executed on the blockchain. Thus, the cost
for a transaction p for the sender of the transaction on a network state x is the
number of edges of the shortest path (for constant fee f0 the cheapest is the
shortest path) times the fee f0,
f(x, p) =
{
(|R(x, p)| − 1) · f0, if R(x, p) 6= ∅
FB , else
On the other hand, the revenue of a node u ∈ N from a transaction p ∈ P
when executed on the network in state x is f0 if node u is part of the cheapest
route R(x, p); otherwise the revenue is zero.
Moreover, the strategy set of a node u ∈N is the set of all strategies available
to node u. It is denoted as Su. The strategy of node u is denoted as µu ∈ Su.
The strategy set in our setting represents the channels a node decides to open at
the beginning of the game. A strategy combination is a set containing a strategy
for every node. The set of all possible strategy combinations is defined as SN :=∏
u∈N Su, while a strategy combination is denoted by µ ∈ SN . For simplicity,
we will abuse the notation µ and µu to also denote the cardinality of the set,
i.e., how many channels are open in the network and how many channels node
u opens in the network, respectively. Last, we define the number of on-chain
payments made by a node u as bu and the total number of on-chain payments
as b =
∑
∀u∈N bu.
Next, we define the necessary functions for the analysis, namely the cost
function, the social cost and the social optimum.
Cost Function. The cost function contains the cost for channel creation, on-
chain payments, payments routed through the network and the revenue from
forwarding payments. For a node u it is defined as
c(µ, µu) = µu · FB + bu · FB +
∑
p∈P :s(p)=u
f(x, p)−
∑
p∈P :u∈R(x,p)
f0
where s(p) denotes the sender of transaction p. In our setting, sender and receiver
of a transaction p are the only relevant pieces of information of each payment,
since all fees are independent of the value of a transaction.
Social Cost. The social cost (or negative welfare) is the sum of the costs of all
nodes
−W =
∑
n∈N
c(µ, µu) = (µ+ b) · FB
Social Optimum. The social optimum is the minimum social cost, which depends
on the number of open channels and the number of payments executed on-chain.
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This term is minimized when all transactions are executed off-chain and the
network forms a tree (connected with minimum number of channels). Hence, the
social optimum is min(−W ) = (N − 1) · FB
3 Channel Creation Game
First, we show some observations that hold generally under any set of transac-
tions and graph structure. Then, we analyze specific structures and determine
under which parameters they constitute a Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Basic Properties
Lemma 1. In a pure Nash equilibrium, no channels are opened twice.
Proof. (Towards contradiction.) Suppose there is a pure Nash equilibrium in
which two nodes have opened a channel with each other twice. In this case,
each node can reduce his cost by not opening the second channel and thus the
strategy cannot be a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Lemma 2. In a pure, strict Nash equilibrium1, none of the transactions are
executed on-chain.
Proof. (Towards contradiction.) Suppose there is a pure, strict Nash equilibrium
in which a node (sender) executes a transaction on-chain. If there is a channel
to the receiver of the transaction, the sender can reduce his cost by simply using
the channel. The same holds if there is a path of channels with total fees less
than the blockchain fee. Therefore, either there is no cheap path from sender to
receiver or no path at all. In this case, if the sender has at least two transactions
to send to the receiver, he would open a channel and reduce the cost. Thus,
the sender has a single transaction to send to the receiver. However, the cost of
opening a channel and the cost of executing the transaction on-chain is exactly
the same (blockchain fee). If we assume there are no transactions routed through
the channel from sender to receiver, the payoff (cost) of the sender in both
strategies is the same. Hence, executing the transaction on-chain cannot be a
strict Nash equilibrium. Thus, there are transactions routed through the channel
from sender to receiver. Then, the payoff of the sender increases and hence the
dominant strategy is to open the channel. This contradicts the assumption that
executing the transaction on-chain is a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Next, we analyse the channel creation game for a homogeneous payment sce-
nario, where every node makes exactly k ≥ 1 payments to every other node. The
number of transactions is therefore P = k ·N ·(N−1). For this payment scenario,
we analyze multiple strategy combinations, i.e., different graph structures such
1 If a strategy is always strictly better than all others for all profiles of other players’
strategies, then it is strictly dominant. If the strategy is strictly dominant for all
players, then it is a strict Nash equilibrium.
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as the path, the star, a complete bipartite graph and the clique, to discover un-
der which parameters these graph structures constitute a Nash equilibrium. We
note that all graph structures that are trees (e.g. path, start, complete bipartite
graph) are social optima.
3.2 Path
The first graph structure we investigate is the path: each node connects to the
node with the next higher ID. The node with the highest ID does not create a
channel, but he is connected to the network through the node with the second
highest ID.
Social Cost. The social cost is −W = (N − 1) · FB .
Nash Equilibrium. A specific strategy is a Nash equilibrium if none of the players
can increase their payoff by deviating from it. This means that the path is a NE
only if all possible deviations lead to higher cost (or equivalent if it is a weak
NE) for the deviating node. We observe that for f0 = 0, deviating from the
path structure cannot decrease the cost, thus the path is a weak NE (similarly
to every other tree structure). However, for any fee f0 > 0, the first node can
increase the revenue from the fees, and thus decrease his cost, by connecting to
a middle node on the path and allowing transactions to be routed through his
channel. Thus, for any non-zero fee, the path is not a NE.
3.3 Star
The second graph structure we investigate is the star: one node creates channels
to everyone else, while the other nodes do not create any channels. The strategy
to create channels to a ∈ [0, N − 1] outer nodes is denoted as (a).
Cost Functions. The cost of the center node is c(µ, (N − 1)) = (N − 1) · FB −
(N − 1) · (N − 2) · k · f0.
The cost of the outer nodes is c(µ, (0)) = (N − 2) · k · f0.
The social cost is −W = (N − 1) · FB .
Nash Equilibrium. A node can only deviate from the strategy as follows: An
outer node creates channels to a ∈ [1, N − 2] other outer nodes. This holds
because in the homogeneous payment scenario, a pure Nash equilibrium demands
a connected graph, else Lemma 2 is violated. This means the center node will
not disconnect the graph. Moreover, from Lemma 1 no outer node will create a
channel to the center node.
If an outer node creates channels to a ∈ [1, N −2] other outer nodes, his cost
function is c(µ, (a)) = a · FB + (N − 2− a) · k · f0 − a · (a− 1) · k · 12 · f0.
If there is an a ∈ [1, N − 2] for which the cost function of an outer node is
decreased, then the star is not a NE. Since the second derivative with respect to
a is strictly negative, we only have to check the corner cases below:
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– For a = 1: c(µ, (0)) < c(µ, (1))⇔ f0 < FBk .
– For a = N − 2: c(µ, (0)) < c(µ, (N − 2))⇔ f0 < FBk · 2N−1 .
Thus, for N > 3, the star is a NE when
f0 <
FB
k
· 2
N − 1
3.4 Star with two centers
We observe that for a very low constant fee any star can be a Nash equilibrium.
Further, we notice that if the fee is high enough the dominant strategy for the
outer nodes is to create more channels, eventually becoming the center of a
second star. We examine this exact case, where there are two center nodes, each
creating channels to all outer nodes, but not to each other. The outer nodes do
not create any channels. We denote the strategy to create a ∈ [0, 2] channels to
center nodes and b ∈ [0, N − 2] channels to outer nodes as (a, b).
Cost Functions. The cost of the center nodes is c(µ, (0, N −2)) = (N −2) ·FB+
k · f0 − (N − 2) · (N − 3) · k · 12f0.
The cost of the outer nodes is c(µ, (0, 0)) = (N − 3) · k · f0 − 2 · k · 1(N−2)f0.
The social cost is −W = 2 · (N − 2) · FB .
Nash Equilibrium. The nodes can deviate as follows:
(A) A center node creates channels to b ∈ [1, N − 3] outer nodes.
(B) A center node creates channels to b ∈ [0, N − 2] outer nodes and creates a
channel to the other center node.
(C) An outer node creates channels to b ∈ [1, N − 3] other outer nodes.
We analyze each case to determine the parameter space for which these devia-
tions do not decrease the cost of a node, and thus the two center structure is a
NE.
(Deviation A) If a center node created channels to only b ∈ [1, N − 3] outer
nodes, his cost function would become
c(µ, (0, b)) = b · FB + k · f0 + (N − 2− b) · k · 2f0 − b · (b− 1) · k · 1
2
f0
This cost function must be higher than c(µ, (0, N−2)) for all b. Since the second
derivative w.r.t. b is strictly negative, we only have to check the corner cases:
– For b = 1: c(µ, (0, N − 2)) < c(µ, (0, 1))⇔ f0 > FBk · 2N+2 .
– For b = N − 3: c(µ, (0, N − 2)) < c(µ, (0, N − 3))⇔ f0 > FBk · 1N−1
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(Deviation B) If an center node creates a channel to the other center node
and channels to b ∈ [0, N − 2] outer nodes, his cost function is
c(µ, (1, b) = (b+ 1) · FB + (N − 2− b) · k · f0 − b · (b− 1) · k · 1
2
f0
This cost function must be higher than c(µ, (0, N − 2)) for all b. Similarly, we
only have to check the corner cases:
– For b = 0: c(µ, (0, N − 2)) < c(µ, (1, 0))⇔ f0 < FBk · 2N .
– For b = N − 2: c(µ, (0, N − 2)) < c(µ, (1, N − 2))⇔ f0 > FBk .
(Deviation C) If an outer node creates channels to b ∈ [1, N − 2] other outer
nodes, his cost function is
c(µ, (0, b)) = b · FB + (N − 3− b) · k · f0 − 2 · k · 1
(N − 2)f0 − b · (b− 1) · k ·
1
3
f0
This cost function must be higher than co(µ, (0, 0)) for all b. Similarly, we only
have to check the corner cases:
– For b = 1: c(µ, (0, 0)) < c(µ, (0, 1))⇔ f0 < FBk .
– For b = N − 3: c(µ, (0, 0)) < c(µ, (0, N − 3))⇔ f0 < FBk · 3N−1 .
Combining all the bounds from the deviating strategies, for N > 3, we derive
the parameter space for which the two center structure is a NE. Specifically, the
conditions reduce to
FB
k
· 2
N
< f0 <
FB
k
· 3
N − 1
3.5 Complete bipartite graph
Previously, we showed that stars with one or two center nodes can be a Nash
equilibrium, if there is a constant fee that fulfills certain conditions. Furthermore,
if f0 is high, outer nodes decrease their cost by creating channels to other outer
nodes. Intuitively, this leads to a NE that is a bipartite graph structure. We
study exactly this case: c ∈ [2,N/2] nodes build a center by creating channels
to everyone else but each other. For simplicity we denote the number of outer
nodes by d := N − c. The network structure now is a complete bipartite graph
with c nodes in the smaller partition and d nodes in the larger partition. We
denote the strategy to create channels to a ∈ [0, c] center nodes and to b ∈ [0, d]
outer nodes as (a, b).
Cost Functions. The cost of the center nodes is c(µ, (0, d)) = d · FB + (c − 1) ·
k · f0 − d · (d− 1) · k · 1cf0.
The cost of the outer nodes is c(µ, (0, 0)) = (d− 1) · k · f0 − c · (c− 1) · k · 1df0.
The social cost is −W = c · (N − c) · FB .
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Nash Equilibrium. The nodes can deviate as follows:
(A) A center node creates channels to only b ∈ [1, d− 1] outer nodes.
(B) A center node creates channels to a ∈ [1, c − 1] center nodes and to b = 0
outer nodes.
(C) A center node creates channels to a ∈ [1, c− 1] center nodes and to b ∈ [1, d]
outer nodes.
(D) An outer node creates channels to b ∈ [1, d− 1] other outer nodes.
Next, we discover the parameter space for which the strategies above lead to the
increase of the cost function of a node.
(Deviation A) If a center node created channels to only b ∈ [1, d − 1] outer
nodes, his cost function would become
c(µ, (0, b)) = b · FB + (c− 1) · k · f0 + (d− b) · k · 2f0 − b · (b− 1) · k · 1
c
f0
This cost function must be higher than c(µ, (0, d)) for all b. Since the second
derivative w.r.t. b is strictly negative, we only check the corner cases:
– For b = 1: c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (0, 1))⇔ FBk · cN+c < f0.
– For b = d− 1: c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (0, d− 1))⇔ FBk · c2N−2 < f0.
(Deviation B) If a center node creates channels to a ∈ [1, c − 1] other center
nodes and to b ∈ [1, d] outer nodes, his cost function is
c(µ, (a, b)) = (a+ b) · FB + (d− b) · k · f0 + (c− 1− a) · k · f0
−b · (b− 1) · k · 1
c
f0 − a · (a− 1) · k · 1
d+ 1
f0
This cost function must be higher than c(µ, (0, d)). Since the second derivatives
w.r.t. a and b are strictly negative, we only have to check the corner cases:
– For a = 1, b = 1:
c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (1, 1))⇔ FB
k
· cN − c
2 − 2c
N2 − cN +N − 3c < f0
– For a = 1, b = d: c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (1, d))⇔ f0 < FBk
– For a = c− 1, b = 1:
c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (c− 1, 1))⇔ FB
k
· cN
2 − 3c2N + cN + 2c3 − 2c2
N3 − 2cN2 + cN −N + c2 − c < f0
– For a = c− 1, b = d: c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (c− 1, d))⇔ f0 < FBk · N−c+1N−1
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(Deviation C) If a center node creates channels to a ∈ [1, c − 1] other center
nodes and to b = 0 outer nodes, his cost function is
c(µ, (a, 0)) = a · FB + d · k · f0 + (c− 1− a) · k · 2f0 − (a) · (a− 1) · k · 1
d+ 1
f0
This cost function must be higher than c(µ, (0, d)) for all a. Since the second
derivative w.r.t. a is strictly negative, we only have to check the corner cases:
– For a = 1:
c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (1, 0))⇔ FB
k
· cN − c
2 − c
N2 − cN −N + c2 − 2c < f0
– For a = c− 1:
c(µ, (0, d)) < c(µ, (c−1, 0))⇔ FB
k
· cN
2 − 3c2N + 2cN + 2c3 − 3c2 + c
N3 − 2cN2 + 2cN −N < f0
(Deviation D) If an outer node creates channels to b ∈ [1, d − 1] other outer
nodes, his cost function is
c(µ, (0, b)) = b ·FB +(d− 1− b) ·k · f0− c · (c− 1) ·k · 1
d
f0− b · (n− 1) ·k · 1
c+ 1
f0
This cost function must be higher than co(µ, (0, 0)) for all b. Since the second
derivative w.r.t. b is strictly negative, we only have to check the corner cases:
– For b = 1: c(µ, (0, 0)) < c(µ, (0, 1))⇔ f0 < FBk
– For b = d− 1: c(µ, (0, 0)) < c(µ, (0, d− 1))⇔ f0 < FBk · c+1N−1
From the analysis on the possible deviations from the strategy, we derive
multiple upper and lower bounds for the value of f0. For N > 3 and 2 ≤ c ≤ N/2
these conditions reduce to the following:
f0 >
FB
k
· cN − c
2 − 2c
N2 − cN +N − 3c
f0 >
FB
k
· cN − c
2 − c
N2 − cN −N + c2 − 2c
f0 <
FB
k
· c+ 1
N − 1
We have defined not only one Nash equilibrium in this analysis, but a whole
class of Nash equilibria. Table 1 shows the numerical values for the bounds of
a complete bipartite graph as Nash equilibrium. Figure 1 shows a plot of the
bounds for N = 103. The Nash equilibria lay in the thin area between the lowest
red and the highest blue line.
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N c lower bound [FB
k
] upper bound [FB
k
] active lb active ub
103 2 .2000000 · 10−2 .30030 · 10−2 5 3
3 .2999991 · 10−2 .40040 · 10−2 5 3
5 .4999925 · 10−2 .60060 · 10−2 5 3
10 .9999192 · 10−2 .11011 · 10−1 5 3
100 .9970024 · 10−1 .10110 3 3
499 .4975016 .50050 3 3
500 .4984984 .50150 3 3
104 2 .20000 · 10−3 .30003 · 10−3 5 3
3 .29997 · 10−3 .40004 · 10−3 5 3
5 .49995 · 10−3 .60006 · 10−3 5 3
10 .99990 · 10−3 .11001 · 10−2 5 3
100 .99981 · 10−2 .10101 · 10−1 5 3
1000 .99971 · 10−1 .10011 3 3
4999 .49976 .50005 3 3
5000 .49985 .50015 3 3
105 2 .200000 · 10−4 .300003 · 10−4 5 3
3 .299997 · 10−4 .400004 · 10−4 5 3
5 .499995 · 10−4 .600006 · 10−4 5 3
10 .999990 · 10−4 .110001 · 10−3 5 3
100 .999990 · 10−3 .101001 · 10−2 5 3
1000 .999971 · 10−2 .100101 · 10−1 3 3
10000 .999971 · 10−1 .100011 3 3
49999 .499976 .500005 3 3
50000 .499985 .500015 3 3
Table 1. Numerical results for the lower and bounds for a complete bipartite graph
as a Nash equilibrium.
3.6 Clique
The last graph structure we investigate is the clique, i.e., the complete graph. In
this case, the i-th node opens N − i channels. The strategy of creating channels
to a nodes without self-loops is denoted as (a).
Cost Functions. The cost of the i-th node is c(µ, (N − i)) = (N − i) · FB . The
social cost is −W = N ·(N−1)2 · FB .
Nash Equilibrium. The nodes can deviate as follows:
(A) The first node creates channels to only a ∈ [1, N − 2] other nodes.
(B) Node i (but not the first or last one) creates channels to only a ∈ [0, N−i−1]
nodes from the set of nodes he would originally connect to (node i + 1 to
node N).
Now, we analyze these deviation strategies to explore the parameter space for
which the strategies above lead to the increase of the cost function of a node.
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Fig. 1. Plots of the bounds for N = 103 with the upper bounds in red and the lower
bounds in blue.
(Deviation A) If the first node creates channels to a ∈ [1, N − 2] other nodes
his cost function is c(µ, (a)) = a ·FB+(N−1−a) ·k ·f0. This cost function must
be higher than c(µ, (N−1)) for all a. Thus, c(µ, (N−1)) < c(µ, (a))⇔ f0 > FBk .
(Deviation B) If node i (not the first or last one) creates channels to a ∈
[0, N − i − 1] nodes from the set of nodes he would originally connect to (node
i+1 to node N), his cost functions is c(µ, (a)) = a ·FB+(N − i−a) ·k ·f0. This
cost function must be higher than c(µ, (N − i)) for all a. Thus, c(µ, (N − i)) <
c(µ, (a))⇔ f0 > FBk .
To summarize, the clique is a Nash equilibrium for f0 > FBk .
3.7 The fee game
In this subsection we investigate how the nodes set the fees, if the network
structure is fixed to one of the previously found Nash equilibria. Especially, we
try to find a Nash equilibrium, which also holds for the conditions discussed
in the previous subsections. Therefore, we slightly change the model as follows:
x is a Nash equilibrium from the previous subsections. The nodes can only
set a constant fee on each of their channels. Further, the nodes cannot create
new channels. We still consider simultaneous game play, i.e., the nodes must
(simultaneously) choose their strategy before any transaction is executed in the
network. The payment scenario is still the same (homogeneous).
Complete Bipartite Graph. We start with a complete bipartite graph with c ∈
[2,N/2] nodes in the smaller partition creating the channels. The goal of this
analysis is to gain a better intuition of the fee evolution and therefore determine
the number of hubs that will be eventually established.
We make following statement about the Nash equilibrium of the described
game.
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Lemma 3. For k > 2, a strategy combination is a (weak) Nash equilibrium if
and only if there are at least two node-distinct paths which are free (zero fees)
for all indirect transactions.
Proof. (→) Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium in which there is a set of k
indirect transactions (according to the payment scenario, each pair of sender
and receiver executes k transactions) that can be routed only through a single
path with positive fees. Then, another node will open a channel to connect the
two nodes and increase his payoff, since on expectation half the k transactions
will go through the new channel. Contradiction.
Suppose now, there is only a single path with zero fees to route the trans-
action. Then, the nodes acting as intermediaries will increase the fee almost
matching the price of the blockchain fee. In such a case, we have the same effect
as described above. Contradiction.
Therefore, there cannot be a single path connecting any two nodes in the
network. Suppose now there are multiple node-distinct paths that connect sender
and receiver, but with positive fees. Then, each node of these paths will decrease
the fee in an attempt to win out the competition by being the cheapest path.
Contradiction. Therefore, any strategy that is a Nash equilibrium must contain
at least two node-distinct paths for each pair of sender and receiver.
(←) If there exist a path with zero fees for every transaction, no node stands
to gain from opening a new channel. Furthermore, increasing the fee in any path
will not lead to the decrease of the cost function (higher revenue) since the path
containing the non-zero fee will be ignored and no transactions will be routed
through such a path. Thus, no node can gain from choosing a different strategy,
i.e., the strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Theorem 1. The complete bipartite graph is not a Nash Equilibrium when the
nodes are free to chose the fees on their channels.
Proof. Follows immediately from Lemma 3 and the lower bound established in
subsection 3.5. uunionsq
Star. Next, we consider the fee evolution when the network structure is a star.
The reason we proceed with this specific network structure is the previous ob-
servations; when nodes can freely chose the fees they impose on their channels,
having multiple paths leads to zero-fee paths. Intuitively, the star does not suffer
from this problem.
Particularly, we notice that the center node is the only node that can charge
fees, since all transactions are routed through the center node. However, in sub-
section 3.3, we showed that there is an upper bound on the value of the fee the
center node can ask for; otherwise other nodes will deviate from the strategy
combination and form a second hub.
Corollary 1. The star is a pure Nash equilibrium when f0 = FBk · 2N−1 − .
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4 Related Work
Payment channels were originally introduced by Spilman [17]. The core idea
was to use unidirectional channels with a predefined sender and receiver. Later,
various constructions for bidirectional payment channels were proposed [6,9,10,
14, 17]. They all use a common account for the parties and off-chain exchange
of signed transactions proving the state of the channel. The creation of multiple
such channels on a common blockchain network leads to the formation of channel
networks, such as the Lightning network [14] on Bitcoin [13], and the Raiden
network [2] on Ethereum [18]. In this work, we study different strategies for
the nodes in such payment networks, independent of which payment channel
construction method is used. Thus, this work applies to all payment channel
solutions.
Avarikioti et al. [5,7] formulated a similar problem to the one studied in this
paper. Their goal was to find an optimal strategy for a central coordinator, a so-
called payment service provider. In contrast to [5,7], our work studies a situation
with multiple players. In other words, our work is rooted in the area of game
theory, whereas [5,7] was using optimization methods. Despite these differences,
we found that the near-optimal solution of [5,7] (the star as network structure)
is also a Nash equilibrium in an uncoordinated situation. So we get a similar
result despite two completely different approaches. This is a strong indication
that the Lightning network (and similar others) will eventually develop into a
more centralized network structure.
Network creation games, originally introduced in by Fabrikant et al. [11], are
used to model distributed networks with rational players. Each player wants to
maximize/minimize a profit/cost function which represents the cost of creating
and using the network. Fabrikant et al. [11] modeled the Internet using Network
Creation Games. They introduced a cost function containing the network cre-
ation cost and the sum of the distances to the other nodes. For their model,
they proved upper and lower bounds for the Price of Anarchy(PoA). They also
conjectured that the Nash equilibria in this game are trees, however this was
disproved by Albers et al. [3]. Alon et al. [4] aimed for stronger bounds on PoA
of the Network Creation Game (sum and local-diameter version). Both these
works, however, use simple cost functions, where the creation cost and the usage
cost of an node are independent. In contrast, in this work the cost function of
a node on the payment network contains both the revenue from the fees of the
channel when the node is an intermediate node in a multihop transaction as
well as the fees paid by the node when he is sending a multihop transaction.
Hence, the cost function depends on the state of the network which itself con-
tains the individual fee policies of the nodes. Overall, the channel creation game
is probably more complex than previous work in this domain.
5 Conclusion
We introduced the first game-theoretic model that encapsulates the payment
channel creation game on blockchain networks. First, we explored various net-
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work structures and determined the parameter space for which they constitute a
Nash equilibrium. For the analysis, we initially assumed a fixed fee policy where
each node benefits the same for each transaction routed through any of his chan-
nels. Then, we briefly considered a free fee policy, where the fee of each channel
is part of the strategy of the node.
Particularly, for the fixed fee policy, we observed that the path is a Nash
equilibrium only when the fee is zero. Otherwise, for a small positive fee we
noticed the formation of a star. Furthermore, we showed that beyond an upper
bound the star ceased to be a Nash equilibrium and multiple star structures
emerged. This observation lead to the investigation of the complete bipartite
graph which defined a class of Nash equilibria dependent on the correlation
between the sizes of the two independent sets of nodes. Finally, the complete
graph was proven to be a Nash equilibrium when the fee is relatively high, as
expected.
More importantly, we showed that even in a free fee policy, the star with
uniform fees almost equal to the upper bound discussed above is a pure Nash
equilibrium. On the contrary, the complete bipartite graph was proven unstable
under this fee policy; we proved that a complete bipartite graph can never be
a Nash equilibrium. We note, that these observations indicate the stability of a
star structure, even though its centralized nature is opposed to the philosophy
of decentralized and distributed payment networks.
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